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The four articles in this symposium were originally presented as papers at a research 
workshop on ‘the right and neoliberalism’ held at Queen Mary, University of London in 
September 2015. The impetus for the workshop was two-fold. First, to reflect on and engage 
with the avalanche of academic literature and commentary (Gamble 2009; Mason 2009; 
Crouch 2011; Roubini 2011; Mirowski 2013) that had emerged in response to the 2008 global 
financial crisis and, in particular, the question of the ongoing durability and resilience of the 
neoliberal regime of political economy across the mature capitalist democracies. Secondly, 
the role of the right and, notably, far-right political currents both within neoliberalism and in 
many of the political responses to the 2008 crisis. Writing this introduction in the wake of the 
decision by UK voters in June 2016 to depart from the European Union and the election of 
Donald Trump to the US presidency in November of the same year on a platform defined by 
nationalist and racist rhetoric and scapegoating reveals all too starkly the connections 
between neoliberalism and the right that the original workshop was concerned with 
exploring.  
These two ‘political earthquakes’ in the liberal political imagination are, obviously, 
significant in themselves and have been, and will be, for some time, the subject of critical and 
scholarly analysis, especially given the intersections of race, class and gender in the politics 
of ‘Trumpism’ and ‘Brexit.’ However, it is also important to note – and this is what the 
articles in this symposium all recognize and comment on, in various ways – is that not only 
was the ‘political brew’ that produced the political outcomes of Brexit and Trump long in the 
making, but they also reveal what could be seen as organic or constitutive pathologies or 
contradictions within the political economy of neoliberalism that, in many respects dates back 
to the emergence of this distinct ideo-political framework in the 1930s. The articles here, 
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then, provide an overview of some of the longstanding connections between the politics of 
the right and the far-right and neoliberalism. And whilst the aim of the articles (based on the 
workshop papers) is not to provide an informed political response or diagnosis to the 
consequences of the 2008 crisis and the subsequent revival of the far-right across much of the 
advanced capitalist world, it is hoped that they provide a set of useful critical 
contextualizations that bring out the important connections between the forces of the right 
and neoliberalism from which progressive and left-leaning political responses can build on.  
What we intend to do in the rest of the introduction is to outline some of the key 
arguments within each of the four articles before moving onto a preliminary assessment of 
the political topography across the Anglosphere in particular with respect to the relationship 
between the right and neoliberalism. In doing so we will offer some, necessarily, 
impressionistic remarks as to how far the ideological-political and social forces of a 
recombined right/far-right axis are now ‘over-determining’ of neoliberalism, suggesting a 
radical break with the neoliberal regime inaugurated in the early 1980s. 
Each of the four articles focuses on distinct dimensions of the relationship between 
the right and neoliberalism and all of them are broadly framed within or sympathetic to 
Marxist-informed critique and commentary to varying degrees. Werner Bonefeld’s 
‘Authoritarian Liberalism: From Schmitt via Ordoliberalism to the Euro’ offers a precise and 
meticulous overview of the political economy of neoliberalism with an emphasis on the 
political and the role and nature of the state in the architecture of neoliberalism. Focusing 
specifically on the ‘ordo-liberal’ foundational strand (Ropke 1998; see also Bonefeld 2017) 
of neoliberalism that emerged in the 1930s in response to what these writers saw as the 
mutual ‘collectivist threats’ of Bolshevism and National Socialism, Bonefeld provides a 
political critique and historical sociology of the key ideas that informed neoliberalism as a 
strategy in response to crisis. The significance of this is these writers were explicit in making 
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political interventions even whilst they claimed to provide generic and ontological claims 
about the relationship between the state and market exchange. This tension – between the 
ontological and contingent or temporal dimensions of neoliberal theory – is also commented 
on in Ray Kiely’s contribution, specifically the tension between what could be seen as a 
‘utopian’ vision of market order based on the spontaneous and de-centred ‘anarchic’ aspects 
of individualized market exchange and the insistence across all strands of neoliberalism for 
state agency to plan and construct the social and ideological foundations for a neoliberal 
market order.  
 Bonefeld, then, brings out the clear political and, implicitly, (bourgeois) class 
dimensions of neoliberalism through the way in which the ordo-liberals advocated a distinct 
political intervention to reconfigure the relationship between state and society through a 
forced separation of the plurality of social interests that had ‘colonised’ the state in the years 
after World War One. Directed specifically at the context of the crisis of the Weimar 
Republic, the ordo-liberal intervention was something that re-appeared, if re-articulated 
within a more ‘acceptable’ political register in Europe and specifically Britain in the 1970s.  
It is through this insistence on ‘cleansing the state’ from the consequences of (social) 
democracy that neoliberalism’s authoritarian impulse can be seen as foundational to it. 
Bonefeld, then, like Kiely, demolishes the sloppy and misconceived if popular presentation of 
neoliberalism as ‘anti-state’ and/or about a straightforward project to create a ‘free market’. 
Consequently, the right – not least the political thought of Carl Schmitt and in spite of 
Hayek’s description of him as ‘Adolf Hitler’s crown jurist’ (Hayek, 1967: 169) – is present at 
neoliberalism’s creation and provides an important and defining dimension of its character. 
The necessity, then, for neoliberalism is an authoritarian political intervention or dictatorship 
of one form or another. This is where the right enters the story as a necessary socio-political 
force to secure such a settlement. Further, as both Bonefeld and Kiely note, whilst the origins 
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of neoliberalism made explicit reference to a hostility to both left and right-wing forms of 
collectivism this did not stop Hayek and others from condoning and supporting right-wing 
authoritarian dictatorship as a necessary basis for the construction of a neoliberal social order.   
In the context of a post-Cold War world where the threats from the radical left are 
diminished, it would seem that the necessity of an authoritarian and right-wing politics would 
not be necessary for neoliberalism. However, as Bonefeld notes, the Eurozone project reveals 
the continuation of a neoliberal political economy informed by the legacies of Weimar, if not 
quite the spirit of Carl Schmitt. In this respect, the key continuity across the very different 
social and geopolitical contexts is the quarantining of democratic social power from any 
substantive intrusion over ‘market sovereignty’.  
This issue of the international or geopolitical dimensions of neoliberalism is also 
addressed by Kiely and in the contribution from Davidson and Saull. Thus, the Eurozone 
project is revealed, in Bonefeld’s eyes, as a quintessential neoliberal arrangement that rests 
on an organic and, in essence, right-wing or conservative, suspicion and hostility towards the 
views of the masses interfering with the consistent and transparent operation of market-rules.  
So whilst the Eurozone is not an example of a ‘commissarial dictatorship’ a’la Alexander 
Rüstow it does reflect a conscious legal-institutional arrangement to ensure what Bonefeld 
calls the operation of ‘market police’ as the fundamental basis of neoliberal political 
economy. 
As already suggested, Ray Kiely’s article, compliments and reinforces much of how 
Bonefeld frames the relationship between neoliberalism and the right.  However, Kiely’s 
contribution extends the analysis of neoliberal theory and its connections with the right in two 
ways. First, through commenting on the long-standing ambivalence within elements of liberal 
political thought in the nineteenth century, as reflected in the writings of John Stuart Mill and 
Alexis de Tocqueville, (as well as prominent conservative thinkers such as Gustav Le Bon 
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and Ortega y Gasset) towards the development of democracy and the acquiring of political 
citizenship by the masses. For Kiely, these writings provide an important intellectual 
reservoir that foresaw the threats to a propertied and market order that democratization would 
present. However, Kiely goes beyond this through revealing the deeper overlaps and 
similarities with a number of quasi-fascist writers such as the Italian elite theorists. Here he 
distinguishes between the ‘political’ and ‘economic’ dimensions of liberalism and through 
this highlights how Schmitt’s critique of the Weimer Republic as a denunciation of liberalism 
only stands up with respect to the political or democratic dimensions of liberalism.  
 Secondly, Kiely develops the analysis outlined in Bonefeld’s contribution through an 
assessment of the so-called ‘Chicago School’ of neoliberalism as well as the role played by 
neoliberal thinking on Western policies in the Cold War across the post-colonial world. Here, 
Bonefeld’s commentary on the neoliberal ‘embrace’ of the authoritarian right is related to a 
more systematic application of what Kiely calls the ‘colonial state of exception’ as a 
justification of the need for authoritarian responses to democratic and left-wing demands 
across much of the colonial world after 1945 and, with it, the justification for the continuation 
of colonial arrangements, most notably in the defence of white settler regimes in southern 
Africa. In many respects then, an important aspect of US and Western policy in the Cold War 
was informed by a neoliberal defence of political authoritarianism.   
 The dominant theme in Kiely’s analysis is the concern over and hostility towards 
mass democracy on the operation of markets and hence the realization of freedom as 
understood by neoliberal intellectuals. Whilst in the context of Weimar and the third world 
after 1945 this was dealt with via the authoritarian state of exception involving an embrace of 
the right and in some cases, the fascist right; in the context of a post-Cold War era the 
Eurozone project reveals its animus towards democracy and hence neoliberal foundations, 
less in the re-emergence of dictatorship and more on a de-politicization of the economic 
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sphere for technocratic remedies which are equally undemocratic. Here, Kiely identifies and 
teases out an important analytical slippage and inconsistency within the neoliberal tradition 
that is particularly associated with Hayek’s work with regard to his epistemological 
suspicions over expert knowledge.  Thus, in his earlier positions and in his critique of 
collectivism ‘of all parties’ Hayek focused on the impossibility of a universal knowledge of 
economic relations in a centralized bureaucracy. Yet, in the case of the Eurozone and the role 
of the technocracy of the European Central Bank this seems to be precisely how the Eurozone 
is managed – via a centralized bureaucratic elite, who are, in effect, removed from any 
democratic scrutiny. 
 Kiely’s insight here as to the differences and contradictions within neoliberalism 
regarding its pre-occupation with immunizing the market order from any mass or democratic 
interventions via authoritarian or technocratic means implicate the right in different ways. In 
the former the right is embraced as a confrere in political struggle to crush the left and 
emasculate if not liquidate democratic institutions through the use of force, whilst in the latter 
the technocratic remedies of a market police institutionalized via the ECB in effect helps 
trigger a nationalist-populist far-right response from within democratic-national locales.  
This is a theme taken up in Davidson and Saull’s contribution, ‘Neoliberalism and the 
Far-Right: An Ambivalent Embrace’. Here, the concern focuses on the contradictions within 
the realization and operationalization of actually existing neoliberalism since the 1980s with a 
particular focus on the neoliberal Anglosphere. Thus, Davidson and Saull track the 
paradoxical connections between the far-right in particular and neoliberal political economy. 
In doing so they bring out the way in which neoliberalism has embraced the far-right and, in 
some cases, they can be seen as co-conspirators in the electoral ascendancy of neoliberal 
regimes as exemplified in the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, whilst, on the other hand, 
the far-right has emerged as an antagonist towards some key elements of the neoliberal order.  
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One way in which the far-right has become a key antagonist within contemporary 
politics is a result of the ideological and policy dominance of neoliberal hegemony in the 
sphere of economic policy. As demonstrated in the third-way articulations of neoliberalism 
(that Kiely also discusses with respect to the operationalization a neoliberal ‘rationality’ 
across the public sphere) whereby – at least up until 2008 – ‘we are all neoliberals now,’ the 
scope of political division and electoral competition was reduced to the so-called ‘culture 
wars’. And it was here, particularly, though not exclusively in the US, where a distinct far-
right current has emerged to capture a significant section of democratic imaginaries. This, as 
Davidson and Saull argue, also implicates race and the reproduction of racialized effects and 
exclusions within neoliberalism, in spite of the claims of both its theorists and political 
cheerleaders as to it ‘colour-blind’ of ‘post-racial’ features.  
It is also here where Davidson and Saull explicitly draw on post and de-colonial 
critiques of neoliberalism through the category of whiteness and, in particular, its connection 
to the emergence of a so-called ‘white working class’ (more on this below) as a key political 
constituency.  The operationalization of neoliberalism then has provoked the far-right. It has 
done so through making permanent the social insecurities that are usually associated with 
economic crisis. Thus, in the realization of the ordo-liberal objective of cleansing the social 
and democratic from the state and ‘de-proletarianizing’ labour power (see Bonefeld), 
neoliberalism has succeeded in producing a permanent state of social insecurity and anxiety 
that also has marked psychological effects (which Nicola Short’s contribution takes up).  In 
doing so it has rendered large sections of the working class and those white (and mainly 
male) workers formerly protected – echoing Du Bois’s ‘wages of whiteness’ as ‘left behind’ 
where they have been open prey to re-imagined white, racist (and imperial) imaginaries.  
However, for Davidson and Saull the connections between the far-right, neoliberalism 
and race go further than this. Indeed, the category of the neoliberal subject is one infused with 
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a racialized identity and a stereotype of whiteness, understood as both the (only) deserving 
recipient of social welfare because of the subject’s active realization of a neoliberal market 
subjectivity. Welfare dependence here is rendered racialized, i.e. it is a problem of colour 
because of the failings of non-white ‘citizens’ to properly act as neoliberal subjects. In such 
scenarios, this also provides a justification for authoritarian-infused social solutions be it by 
way of law-and-order policies and/or punitive welfare. It also suggests that the far-right 
provides a form of ideological suture to the social malaise produced by neoliberalism. 
The other aspect where the racialized dimensions of neoliberalism have played out 
and provoked a far-right animus concerns immigration. Here, as reflected in the Brexit vote 
and election of Trump, the far-right has taken advantage of racialized fears of migration. Yet, 
in this respect as Davidson and Saull note, the far-right appears as an antagonist of neoliberal 
capital that risks undermining the existing regime of political economy. Such a position 
obviously deals with any suggestion that this rendering of the far-right/neoliberal embrace is 
a ‘functionalist’ one given that the far-right challenges an important neoliberal globalizing 
orthodoxy associated with ‘flexible’ labour marks, the efficient utilization of the factors of 
production and the driving down of labour costs and labour’s ‘monopolistic tendencies’. 
However, Davidson and Saull are clear that whilst anti-immigration position’s de-stabilize 
the operations of neoliberalism alongside the far-right’s utilization of national-centred 
democratic imaginaries in populist opposition to the international-institutionalist frameworks 
of the Eurozone (or global free trade regimes in the US case); in themselves, these reveal the 
limits of the far-right critique and ability to go beyond neoliberalism. Thus, whilst fetishizing 
the spatial or geopolitical dimensions of neoliberal political economy, the far-right – in the 
form of the Tea-Party and UKIP amongst others – have been willing cheerleaders for the 
dismantlement of the post-war social democratic welfare settlement and the wider penetration 
of market and 'entrepreneurial’ incentives across society and the public sector.  In short, then, 
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the far-right has, in many respects, provided an important populist and ‘democratic’ 
legitimation for much of the neoliberal project over the last twenty years which, obviously, 
questions the depth and significance of its anti-neoliberal let alone anti-capitalist pretensions. 
Nicola Short’s article, ‘On the Subject of Far-Right Wing Politics’ compliments the 
symposium through offering an analysis of the ‘psychological determinants’ of the far-right. 
Here, she engages with less commonly-cited scholarly work, including Reich’s Mass 
Psychology of Fascism to outline the co-ordinates of a historical-materialist framed 
psychological analysis of the ‘mind-set’ and emotional triggers determining a far-right 
politics.  
Short contextualizes more recent scholarly debates as to the psychological 
constitution of political subjectivity in the neoliberal era through focusing on the 
psychological bases of fascism and, in particular connecting the way in which a material or 
structural context of economic crisis is absorbed and responded to on a psychological and 
emotional level. This, she argues, provides the social bases of fascism, that is, the way in 
which economic dislocations, anxieties and grievances open up the possibilities of large 
numbers of people being receptive to a fascist-like politics. This is because fascist appeals to 
anger, grievance, emotion and violence are more psychologically pre-disposed in such socio-
economic contexts. 
Short’s main focus, however, is the neoliberal context and the way in which this 
particular regime of political economy has helped generate distinct psychological framings of 
the political. Here, Short emphasizes how the neoliberal period, indeed, the type of social-
psychological subjects that it seeks to mould and create, has generated an increasingly 
narcissistic tendency across neoliberal societies as a ‘socially mandated’ consequence of the 
permanent insecurities and anxieties of its operations which, at the same time stigmatizes 
such fears and dependencies as ‘shameful’. In moments of crisis, far-right responses – which 
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amount to articulations of blame, resentment and anger – find a receptive psychological pre-
disposition across particular class layers through the way in far-right rhetoric and aesthetics is 
at once reassuring and comforting regarding those who belong and what the core foundations 
of the social order should be, as well as offering an emotionally-charged rhetoric that is both 
anti-establishment and anti-elitist but without, at the same time, questioning the fundaments 
of the existing social order that these particular class layers are socially and psychologically 
invested in. 
Short’s analysis is particularly timely given the discussion of the personality and 
psychological character of Donald Trump and many of his supporters. For Short, whilst the 
context of crisis and long-standing political disillusionment and dis-engagement have 
provided an important context for a figure like Trump to enter the political stage, because of a 
prevailing narcissism that combines with highly vulnerable subjects; their sense of 
powerlessness facilitates an identification with  ‘grandiose’ and ‘powerful figures’ such as 
Trump. Thus, figures such as Trump,  
offer a clear representation of the psychodynamics of the far-right: a strong 
investment in the neoliberal fantasy of market-based individual autonomy that is 
rhetorically hostile to establishment elites while disavowing any dependency on 
state support for their achievements. 
 
This, obviously, brings us to the current political conjuncture where the inter-
connections between the right/far-right and neo-liberalism have taken a new and dramatic 
turn and not only in the vote for Brexit and Trump’s ascendancy to the US presidency. This 
can be seen with the rise of populist movements across Europe and authoritarian turns in 
(among others) the Philippines, Brazil and Turkey.  
This is not the place for a full analysis of the resurgence of authoritarian populism 
(see Muller 2016) but a few observations can be noted, not least as they speak to the concerns 
of the articles that follow. First there is the question of the social basis of support for an 
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authoritarian turn and second is the nature of the political programmes. In terms of the first 
question, the issue of ‘white working class’ support for Trump should be treated with 
considerable caution (Davis 2017). Insofar as sections of workers supported Trump and had 
an impact on the election, it was significant above all in Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Pennsylvania, where a swing at the margins led to victory for Trump in all these states 
(McQuarrie 2016). But even these swings should be put into perspective. Although there was 
a 16 per cent national shift among poorer voters to Trump, in the Rustbelt 5 (Iowa, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio and Wisconsin) a 10.6 per cent point swing to Trump was significantly 
less than the 21.7 per cent swing away from the Democrats in the same states (Kilbarda and 
Roithmayr 2016).  There is some evidence which suggests that Trump did well, not 
necessarily among lower income groups per se, but in areas where economic anxiety rather 
than income per se was particularly high, especially among those with low credit ratings, in 
counties where men have stopped working, where people had sub-prime loans before 2008, 
or where more residents received high disability payments. This then is a story less about 
income per se, and more about identifying areas where economic prospects have declined 
most steeply, and Trump’s support in these areas was significant (Casselman 2017). This also 
speaks to both the psychological and emotional pull of far-right rhetoric across distinctly 
vulnerable socio-economic layers and the moral-aesthetic dimensions of far-right appeals in a 
context of neoliberal anomie. 
 Perhaps related, Trump was far more successful in winning votes among those who 
had an unfavourable view of both candidates (Anderson 2017: 42). There is some parallel 
here with the Brexit vote, which again was won by votes among higher income groups but 
also where there were significant areas of working class support which reflected a negative 
solidarity, where there was limited expectation that Brexit or Trump will necessarily lead to 
social improvement, but rather that people have very little to lose in the first place, and if they 
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have to suffer, than so should everyone else (Davies 2016a). Significant here is levels of 
despair in the US, where from 1999 to 2013, in some locations there has been a rise in 
morbidity and mortality rates among white non-Hispanic middle aged men, linked to alcohol 
and narcotic abuse, and high rates of suicide (Case and Deaton 2015; 2017). 
Trump’s relationship with neoliberalism and the (Far) Right is also far from 
straightforward. In his campaign at least, he appeared to be closer to the paleo-conservative 
tradition in the US (Gottfried 2001; Scotchie 1999), which supports a shift (in theory) 
towards greater isolationism, promises on limits to free trade, and much more overt anti-
immigration rhetoric, much of which challenges neoliberalism. Moreover, while the rise of 
populist politicians such as Trump owes something to the legacy of the culture wars launched 
by the New Right from the 1960s, equally it can be seen to be a reaction to neoliberal 
technocratic rationality, with the result that both liberal reason and neoliberal rationality are 
conflated and treated with equal contempt. Part of Trump’s appeal is based on this rejection 
and what in effect amounts to the triumph of unreason (Davies 2016b).  
Paleo-conservatives are particularly critical of what they call the managerial state 
(Gottfried 2001), but (in contrast to neoconservatives) what is distinctive about the paleo-
conservative tradition is that it argues that managerialism persisted in the Reagan 
administration. In particular the neoconservative takeover in the 1980s meant that in effect 
conservatives were embracing liberal values and committing the United States to a global 
liberal empire. This persisted with the Democrat administrations that followed and the paleo-
conservatives instead advocate isolationism, nativism and protectionism. In effect then this 
means that the managerial state in recent years has become even more distant from 
Americans, which is run by either liberal internationalists or neo-conservatives, both of which 
are in effect ‘transnational post-Americans’ (Francis 2016). This tradition also represents a 
highly racialised and masculinist conception on the American nation, which is nostalgic for a 
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parochial sense of home and the nation, in which identity was less politicised and white 
supremacy more secure, and the US was unquestionably the leading nation in the capitalist 
world. In effect then, this amounts to a critique of ‘globalisation’ from the Right and, 
potentially, a significant rupture with significant aspects of the the neoliberal order 
inaugurated in the early 1980s. 
It was therefore not surprising that Trump enjoyed support among the so-called alt-
right movement in the US, which – like Le Pen in France – has been critical of neoliberalism. 
But on the other hand, one prominent Silicon Valley entrepreneur, Peter Theil, was prominent 
in supporting Trump in the election, and here we can see some consistency with an 
authoritarian neoliberalism.  Like Hayek, Theil (2009) argues that freedom and democracy 
are incompatible, and the former is more important than the latter, and there is “a need for 
entrepreneurs to escape…not via politics but beyond it” (Theil 2009). By 2011, he argued 
that there was a crisis in the US, and this presented an opportunity for renewed ‘creative 
destruction’. Unlike some other libertarians, Theil argues that government should support 
private interests but carry out high levels of research and development spending, through 
which individual entrepreneurs can then accrue significant rewards (as was the case with the 
Internet, as we have seen).  In this way, the private sphere can essentially benefit from 
appropriate state spending. But at the same time as there should be massive state spending on 
research and infrastructure (as Trump proposes), there also needs to be tax cuts. Following 
the claims made for the Laffer Curve, this will lead to such high rates of economic activity 
that tax revenue can remain high – except of course it did not in the 1980s, and infrastructure 
spending is likely to be based on a public-private partnership and will be lucrative for the 
private sector and will come at the expense of the public sector. But this also suggests the 
need for a strong state, and an authoritarian leader, who can limit the politicised expectations 
and demands of the population as a whole.  
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And once in power, Trump appeares to have shifted even more towards an 
authoritarian neoliberalism, and indeed even an increasingly neoconservative foreign policy, 
much to the consternation of some prominent alt-right agitators. This included a variety of 
appointments straight from ‘the swamp’, proposed repeals of (limited) controls on finance, a 
toning down of anti-free trade and anti-China rhetoric, increased use of military force in the 
Middle East and the threat of force against North Korea, and (at the time of writing) an 
apparent marginalisation of Steve Bannon’s America First strategy, much to the delight of 
neo-conservative intellectuals, and indeed a good deal of liberal internationalist 
commentators. 
The Brexit vote is much harder to pin down, not least because – as the articles that 
follow suggest – the EU is in many respects an increasingly neoliberal institution, as is clear 
from the limits placed on governments by state aid rules, the Growth and Stability Pact and 
the disciplinary effect of the Euro on some countries. But in some respects this is precisely 
the problem for at least one strand of anti-Brexit sentiment, for as the articles that follow 
argue, while neoliberals need the state, they are also highly critical of it. The likes of the 
Conservative Free Enterprise Group, Economists for Brexit, the Adam Smith Institute, as 
well as Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and the Leave directors Dominic Cummings and 
Matthew Elliott, and former Cameron adviser Steve Hilton (d’Ancona 2016), are all critical 
of the bureaucracy emanating from Brussels, and they believe that the bureaucratic structure 
in Brussels is not conducive to the promotion of the ‘free market’. Thus, for Dominic 
Cummings (2013), there is little patience with negotiations and rules, because there is “too 
much trust in people and institutions that are not fit to control so much.” Like those 
neoliberals who opposed the 2008 bail-outs, this is a position which advocates creative 
destruction and spontaneous order, and there is little focus on questions of order and social 
stability (Finlayson 2016).  
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Leaving the EU thus presents the possibility of freedom, the market and spontaneity, 
which has so far been unfulfilled. That Brexit will present an enormous range of difficulties, 
such as what (bureaucratic) rules will be instigated in the name of Brexit, particularly in a 
context where 60 per cent of world trade is intra-firm and rests on standardisation of rules 
between different countries. One likely outcome of Brexit then is an enormous proliferation 
of transaction costs, and thus bureaucracy, in the name of free trade. The creative destruction 
solution to these problems rests precisely on the kind of a-social, methodologically 
individualist promise of neoliberalism which is a fantasy, because neoliberalism and the 
supposed rule of the market rests on all kinds of extra-market mechanisms, and while these 
might periodically be experienced as bureaucratic restrictions by individual companies, they 
are also necessary for these companies to exist in the first place.  
But it is precisely this fantasy which links Brexit and Trump, because the latter in 
effect proposes an authoritarian ‘solution’ to the crisis of democracy, in which a decisionist 
leader requires validation only from public acclaim to act. While this might sound like a 
politicisation of civil society, and thus contrary to neoliberalism, it actually closely parallels 
the authoritarian liberal arguments of the ordo-liberals, and in this way Trump can be seen as 
a figure whose self-portrayal is compatible with the Schumpeterian heroic entrepreneur in the 
economic sphere, and the exceptional Schmittian figure in the political sphere, which is in 
some respects the logical culmination of neoliberalism. Trump, as the CEO of ‘America Inc’ 
has promised to run the country as he runs his business and seen in this way, it is the 
culmination of the (utopian) project of neoliberalism, namely the marketization of society. 
Seen in this way, Trump is an authoritarian but not a fascist. His administration has not taken 
over the state or even – despite its undoubted authoritarianism – attempted to do so. Indeed, 
for all of Trump’s condemnation of Democrat obstructionism, the administration has been 
slow to nominate people into prominent positions within the state. Trump has highly 
16 
 
orchestrated rallies but not a mass movement or paramilitary organisation. His right-wing 
authoritarianism in part comes from those around him, but also from his own distinctive 
position. Schmittian exceptionalism in the 1930s was based on the need for a strong leader to 
deal with a weak Weimar state captured by particular interests, not least Communists and the 
left. The rise of Trump has some parallels here but there is something distinctive about his 
exceptionalism which distinguishes him from the Nazis, and indeed the Italian fascists before 
him. While Italian and German fascists captured the state to deal with weak, corrupt liberal 
democracy, Trump in effect aims to by by-pass these institutions, in the name of national 
competitiveness. In other words his authoritarianism is in fact rooted in the fact that he wants 
to run the United States as if it was a company, and this leads to impatience with the 
democratic process and the bureaucratic state (and in this regard there is a strong overlap with 
right-wing libertarian arguments around Brexit).  
The question, politically, going forward is what happens – as looks likely in both the 
UK and the US – when the right-wing and nationalist dimensions of each political rupture are 
unfulfilled or disappoint some of the key social layers behind each. Thus, the racism and re-
assertion of a politics of ‘white supremacy’ that has been unleashed looks likely to be 
unfulfilled in terms of the fundamental workings of the political economy and the 
complexion of society within the political projects of ‘Trumpism’ and Brexit. The issue, then, 
is preparing for what might come down the line thereafter.  
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